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In their article, the authors deal with the role of civil society as a factor
of European democratic governance. Democratic governance is per-
ceived as an ‘extended polyarchy’ that refers both to the electoral di-
mension of accountability and to the mechanisms of permanent con-
trol over power-holders through institutional balance of power. The au-
thors examine specifics of governance and civil society at the eu level,
claiming that participatory democracy is unrealistic at the eu level,
which holds also for citizens’ engagement in civil society organized at
eu level. They argue that civil society organized at the eu level can con-
tribute to higher accountability of the Union’s institutions, but in a spe-
cific way, less through enhancing political engagement of citizens and
linking them to political institutions but more through mutual control
of diﬀerent societal actors that would foster greater transparency of po-
litical process.
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Introduction
Governance that in general terms refers to the system of measures that
involve setting the rules for the exercise of power and settling conflicts
over such rules (Hyden 1999, 185) is one of the most widely used political
concepts and takes a central place in contemporary debates in social sci-
ences (Pierre and Peters 2000, 1). In the last years, the notion of a need for
establishment of mechanisms of eﬃcient and democratic governance not
only on the national but also on supra-national level has gain on impor-
tance. These would mean creation of institutions that would be able to
deal with problems brought by the processes of globalization, especially
in the sense of provision of global public goods (see, for example, Grif-
fin 2003), and enhancing the accountability of global actors (see Kahler
2004; Held 2004).
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The issue of governance is strongly related with democracy, i. e. its
status as a form of political order. The so called third wave of democra-
tization (Huntington 1993) that started in the 1970s in Southern Europe,
continued in the 1980s in Latin America and ended with the collapse of
communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe in 1989, brought the
spread of democracy as a form of government that has been unprece-
dented in history. However, there are disagreements about the prospects
of the development of democracy. While some analysts see some prob-
lematic elements in the situation after the fall of communism, that may
instead of world-wide democratic order bring the new world disorder
(see Jowitt 1993), others claim that nowadays democracy has no equal
contender on the global level (see Plattner 1991). The fact is that the
number of formally democratic countries from the early 1970s more than
doubled (Diamond 1999, 25). However, reversals of democratic processes
are not excluded, as well as processes which could undermine the quality
of governance of advanced societies. Stability and progress of the demo-
cratic process thus depends on political as well as non-political institu-
tions and actors and their mutual relations, especially in terms of their
ability to cooperate for the common good.
In our article, we will examine the role of civil associations as a fac-
tor of democratic governance at the level of the European Union, a
political entity which is the most integrated supra-national association
in the modern world. It is characterised by complex interactions and
networking between public and private actors. As Smismans (2006, 6)
points out, this may be a democratic time bomb as it challenges tradi-
tional ideas of democratic accountability but may also provide a poten-
tial to deepen democracy through participatory procedures. It is often as-
sumed that eu citizens can gain new power and voice through the mobi-
lization in transnational civic organizations. These organizations should
represent mechanisms of vertical accountability that may include citi-
zens acting through civic organizations on the eu level policy processes.
In this theoretical framework organised civil society is seen as a lever for
a higher degree of participative democracy in the eu (Kohler-Koch and
Finke 2007; Cichowski 2007).
The purpose of our article is to test some of these assumptions and
to contribute to a wide, ongoing academic and policy debate about the
role of civil society in the eu governance. First we will clarify some con-
ceptual issues of modern democracy and elaborate the very concept of
democratic governance and its main components, and then we will deal
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with the specifics of governance and civil society at the eu level, espe-
cially in terms of the relation between civil actors and political institu-
tions and the role of civil associations as agents of European governance.
We will present our empirical studies, which aimed to explore the ability
of civic organisations to mediate between eu citizens and ‘their’ institu-
tions. Our empirical work focuses on intra-organisational ties andmech-
anisms of communication and cooperation in transnational civic organi-
sations in the eu. We assumed that the quality of these organisational ties
could play an important role in assuring democratic eﬀects of civic or-
ganisations at the eu level but we questioned the ability of transnational
organisations to develop sustainable ties reaching across diﬀerent levels
of eu’s governance (reaching from eu citizens organised on local levels,
across national levels and supranational level to the eu institutions and
back again to the grassroots of society) which could ensure vertical ac-
countability. Consequently our thesis is that civil society organized at the
eu level can contribute to higher accountability of the eu’s institutions,
but in a specific way, less through enhancing political engagement of cit-
izens and linking them to political institutions but more through mutual
control of diﬀerent societal actors that would foster greater transparency
of political process.
Good Governance in a Democratic Polity
Dilemmas about the future of democracy as a system of governance at the
national as well as supra-national level lead us to the very notion of this
term, meaning that some conceptual issues ought to be clarified. First of
all, it should be pointed out that democracy is a complex phenomenon
which could refer to some kind of ideal state of society, characterized
by perfect freedom and equality where the real power is located in the
hands of people, as well as to real-existing forms of socio-political order,
usually referring to modern Western societies (often in connection with
the market economy). As stated by Michael Saward (2000, 3), ‘the story
of democracy is nothing if a story of innovation’. It is thus characterized
by dynamism and openness to new ideas, notions and concepts. Even
by the notion of democracy as an existing system (which is nevertheless
our research interest) we have diﬀerent definitions of its ‘scope’ (in the
sense of its constitutive elements). Many theorists advocate the minimal-
ist approach, a kind of Schumpeterian definition of democracy as a sys-
tem in which citizens can choose between diﬀerent political actors/elites
(Schumpeter 1996). In that case, the most important issue is the exis-
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tence of institutional mechanisms, which enable free political competi-
tion (of course, with constitutionally determined exceptions) and selec-
tion of preferable alternatives. The weakness of this approach is its ‘shal-
lowness’. Namely, because of its focus on the normative level of politics
it often disregards the back-stage happenings, as well as factors that are
not a part of the political system but nevertheless importantly influence
its nature.
However, there is another, more ‘qualitative’ notion of democracy
which takes into account the conditions needed for its ‘healthy’ func-
tioning. Dahl’s concept of polyarchy as ‘real-existing democracy’ con-
tains the following institutional factors, necessary for the persistence of
democracy: elected oﬃcials, free, fair and relatively frequent elections,
freedom of expression, alternative sources of information, autonomy of
association and inclusive citizenship (Dahl 1971; 1989; 1998). Some theo-
rists stress the importance of institutional factors like viable civil society,
rule of law, competent and autonomous civil service etc., without which
democratic political life is not possible. O’Donnell stresses the need for
control over power-holders through mechanisms of so – called horizon-
tal accountability, which refers to the mutual control in the sense of a
system of checks and balances – the principal condition for it is the ex-
istence of independent control institutions (judiciary, diﬀerent agencies
etc.) (O’Donnell 1998; see also Schedler et al. 1999). There are also some
other factors that are often mentioned as conditions of fully developed
democracy, for example the existence of welfare policies and other mech-
anisms for tackling social inequalities.
Despite the desirability of such kind of qualitative completion, it is
necessary to warn against other kind of biases in a case when one wants
to include into a framework of democracy everything that is in his/her
opinion necessary for the well being of the people. In this way, the char-
acteristics of the concept could become blurred. Too idealized a notion
of democracy is problematic since it could lead into disappointment and
the belief that democratic order does not exist at all – in this way, he/she
neglects the diﬀerences between diﬀerent levels of democracy of exist-
ing political systems. As stated by Karl and Schmitter (1996, 59), democ-
racy is even not necessarily more economically and administratively eﬃ-
cient and orderly run than other forms of government. Considering this,
we could agree with Samuel Huntington who says: ‘Governments pro-
duced by election may be ineﬃcient, corrupt, short-sighted, irrespon-
sible, dominated by special interests, and incapable of adopting poli-
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cies demanded by the public good. These qualities make such govern-
ments undesirable but they do not make them undemocratic.’ (Hunt-
ington 1991, 10.) But we could add to this that such characteristics make
democracies of lower quality.
In our conceptualization, we connect good governance to the notion
of democracy as an ‘extended polyarchy’. This means a supplementation
of the original (Dahlean) concept that is related primarily to the electoral
dimension of accountability (i. e. processes of political selection based
on freedom of political action and political equality) with mechanisms
of permanent control over power-holders through institutional balance
of power between diﬀerent branches of government as well as through
mutual checking of civil and state actors on a diﬀerent level of polity.
Our definition of good, i. e. democratic governance is, thus, in ac-
cordance witha ‘wider’ notion of democracy, meaning not only formal
rules and institutional norms but also the performance of democratic
institutions and their agents. As stated by March and Olsen (1995, 44),
‘democratic governance is more than the management of eﬃcient po-
litical coalition building and exchange within prior constraints [. . .] It
involves moulding social and political life – shaping history, an under-
standing of it, and an ability to learn from it.’ In this sense, it is related
to the state of political stability, perceived in a dynamic and flexible way,
as the ‘capacity of the political system to be selective when including in
its modus operandi relevant actors and topics, and the capability of de-
veloping the problem-solving capacities in order to fulfil the functions
entrusted to it’ (Adam 1994, 37).
Quality of Governance at the EU Level
Since the European Union has been developing into the direction of a
more integrated form of political entity, the issue of governance at the
Union’s level is becoming increasingly relevant. It stopped functioning
as an inter-state association but continued as a political formation with
institutions, activities and authorities on its own. An important question
is whether and towhat extent the model of good governance, described
above, is applicable to the level of the European Union. Aspects of demo-
cratic governance like system stability, inclusiveness and eﬀectiveness are
to some extent important for political life at the eu level. However, it
is not possible simply to transplant to the eu institutions the principles
of democracy that are in place at the level of member-states. There are
certain limits to democracy at the eu level if one means by the term
Volume 6 · Number 4 · Winter 2008
408 Matevž Tomšicˇ and Mateja Rek
‘democracy’ the majoritarian principle with equal weight of each citi-
zen’s political preference (the rule ‘one person, one vote’). What is often
stressed is so called ‘democratic deficit’ (see Norton 1996), meaning the
lack of many features we associate with democratic governance (Horeth
1999, 249), such as involvement of citizens in the political processes at
the Union’s level and their influence on European aﬀairs. The eu is too
diﬀerent from the domestic democratic institutions that citizens are used
to. As a result, citizens have troubles in understanding the eu, and have
problems with adressing and regarding it as a democratic system, nor
can they identify with it (Follesdal and Hix 2006).
This is related to the realization that eu institutions increasingly,
through broadening of their policy scopes, directly influence lives of
the citizens of the eu, who – if we for instance consider the data from
Eurobarometer (2008) – don’t really care much for participation on the
eu level, don’t think that their ‘voice is heard on the level of the eu’
and don’t express high levels of trust regarding the eu institutions. The
democratic challenge is one of the reasons why the eu was for instance
trying to produce a new constitution and is fostering the development
of organized civil society on the level of the eu, designed to make the
Union easier to understand, more open and more eﬃcient. One of the
main targets of criticism of such a process is its top-down nature that
leads to the perception of it as an elite project or enterprise (see, for
example, Dahl 1999), which makes the possibility of establishment of
mechanisms of vertical accountability that may include citizens acting
through the electoral process or indirectly via civic organizations rather
questionable.
One has to acknowledge that a number of mechanisms of accountabil-
ity have been put in place in the eu. Electoral accountability, involving
the European Parliament, is only part of the picture. eu institutions are
accountable to governments; agencies within governments are held ac-
countable to one another through the process of ‘comitology’; a consid-
erable degree of transparency holds participants, much of the time, ac-
countable to the public through the media. Additionally there is a need
for mechanisms of permanent control over power-holders through mu-
tual checking of civil and eu actors on a diﬀerent level of polity, as it is
assumed that a number of elements of democracy and accountability are
still lacking in the eu. This is true on at least two levels. On one level, the
eu lacks the kind of integrated public sphere and civil society that sus-
tains democracy and accountability in national states. On the other level,
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the eu’s institutions fall short of standards of democracy and account-
ability: popular representation plays only a minor role in many policy
areas, and mechanisms of accountability are not always well-developed.
In addition, the eu’s policy-making system as well as its political system
is not transparent, which prevents eﬀective democratic control and ac-
countability. Solutions to these perceived problems are compounded by
the multilevel character of the eu and the diversity between its member
states.
This can be clearly seen in the case of the organized civil society on the
level of the eu, where even the very basic questions of who are the actors
of the civil society (Magnette 2006; Armstrong 2003), organized on the
level of the eu, being a multi-form, multi-dimensional and multi-level
phenomenon, and what should be their role in the processes of European
integration, are unclear and left to contested interpretations. This aﬀects
functional mechanisms of communication and cooperation among civil
society actors and the eu bodies (Fazi in Smith 2006) which – as we will
argue – even though they are intended to foster vertical accountability
do not really reach across diﬀerent levels of the multilevel system of eu
governance.
Civil Society as an Actor of EU Governance
It is often assumed that transnational European civic organizations can
play an intermediary role between the citizens and institutions of the
eu (cec 2001; 2006) and with these processes also establish mechanisms
of vertical accountability that may include citizens acting through civic
organizations on the eu level. This assumption plays a key role in defin-
ing the ways in which civic organizations, that are active at the eu level,
access and can influence the eu policy making (Fazi and Smith 2006;
Kohler-Koch and Finke 2007). In the White Paper on European Gover-
nance we can find following statement: ‘Civil society plays an important
role in giving voice to the concerns of the citizens and delivering ser-
vices that meet people’s needs. [. . .] Civil society increasingly sees Europe
as oﬀering a good platform to change policy orientations and society.
[. . .] It is a real chance to get citizens more actively involved in achieving
the Union’s objectives and to oﬀer them a structured channel for feed-
back, criticism and protest.’ (cec 2001, 34.) Other important documents,
which are defining the dialogue between civic organizations and the Eu-
ropean Commission, like The Green Paper (cec 2006) or the document
called ‘Communication on general principles and minimum standards
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for consultation of interested parties by the Commission’ (2003) are full
of similar ideas, when defining the role of transnational civic organi-
zations in the eu. Consultations with civic organizations is becoming
a common procedure of policy processes on the eu level (see Fazi and
Smith 2006; Gornitzka and Sverdrup 2007), even though there are still a
number of unresolved questions, especially regarding the representation,
accountability in the actual ability of transnational civic organizations,
to mediate across the eu’s multilevel system. One of the biggest concerns
is, whether transnational civic organizations are actually able to mobilise
Europeans on specific policy issues and whether they can promote inter-
ests and participation of the eu citizens and on their behalf influence the
policy making of the eu institutions.
There are thousands of civic organizations in the eu. Many of them
have organized themselves on the eu level with intent to influence the
policy making on the eu level. Such transnational organizations usually
adopt a multilevel structure, including local, national and international
elements. European consent is consent between member states, and the
structuring of eu associations mainly follows these guidelines. eu as-
sociations are mostly confederate structures or, so say, umbrella orga-
nizations„ i. e. associations of national associations, that were set up by
their members for the purpose of representing their political interests
in eu policy-making (Greenwood 2005); even though other forms are
also present (individual-based organizations, virtual organizations etc.).
These umbrella organizations should ‘not only mobilize, but represent
a framework for resolving conflicts and reaching agreements, which in
turn results in better cooperation and integration of activities’ (Hadenius
and Ugga 1996, 1622). We should also stress that the majority of these eu
associations are composed of national groups/organisations and not of
eu citizens (Kohler-Koch 2005; Rek 2007). Their members are national
organizations, which present views and concerns as well as represent in-
terests of their citizens or local civic organizations on the eu level. The
concept of participation within organized civil society at the level of the
eu is limited to organized interests and groups (Magnette 2006) and pro-
vides spaces of interest representation (Warleight 2001; 2003), advocacy
(Skocpol and Morris 1999; Ruzza 2008) and lobbying (Saurugger 2006;
Greenwood 2005; 2008) and not active participation of citizens.
In an absence of active participation of eu citizens directly on the
eu level, the organizational ties of transnational civic organizations (be-
tween local, national and supranational/eu level) become crucial for
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civil society to be able to play the assumed intermediary role between
the eu citizens and ‘their’ institutions. To better understand the qual-
ity and strength of these ties within transnational organizations, which
are reaching across diﬀerent levels of the eu governance, Mateja Rek and
Frane Adam (Adam 2007a; Rek 2007) organized a workshop entitled ‘So-
cial Capital, Civic Engagement and Quality of Governance in the Euro-
pean Union’ in December 2005 in the framework of the 6th framework
connex project. The workshop was structured as a focus group. The
aim of our focus group was to gain additional insights into current re-
flections on the role, functioning and characteristics of civil society or-
ganised at the eu level by bringing together practitioners (ngos and in-
terest group representatives, policy-makers etc.)⁴⁰ working in the field of
civil society in the eu with scientists researching these issues.
The participants in our focus group painted a quite pessimistic pic-
ture of co-operation and communication across diﬀerent levels of the
internal organization of eu associations: Talking about European asso-
ciations, ideally there is a European representation and membership –
national members, regional members. In order to be eﬀective in interest
representation and in influencing policy decisions, all members should
be well prepared to be engaged in the agenda of the discussion and to
make compromises and good decision-making possible. It is highly im-
portant that everybody is prepared to find a common position and that
this common position is accepted across diﬀerent levels of the confed-
eral composition. This is a question of culture, that includes both the
national characteristics that individual players ‘bring to the table’ as well
as the organizational culture of a particular association. Once the com-
position has been agreed on, it is lobbied during the European decision-
making process, preferably with one voice, at the national level vis-à-vis
the national institutions and at the same time vis-à-vis the Commission
and the parliamentarians in the eu. If everybody is well briefed then
there are much greater chances of a successful lobbying outcome.
Yet, as argued by the participants in the focus groups, this is an ideal
model but in practice there are usually issues of communication and
problems of co-ordination among the diﬀerent layers. On the one hand,
a specialised body of expertise is centered in Brussels and they are the
only ones who have contacts, knowledge and up-to date information
about the current state of aﬀairs at the eu level. But at the same time
it was argued that regional and national organizations, even though they
are aﬃliated with the Brussels level, often do not recognise the impor-
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tance of lobbying at the eu level or taking advantage of these aﬃliations
for co-ordinated actions among diﬀerent levels. In that sense, the verti-
cal communication and co-operation within the multi-level structure of
interest group associations seems to be very weak.
In Brussels everything makes sense to everyone in Brussels. It makes per-
fect sense, all the policies, and the processes. But this needs to be translated
down to the national level to regional levels and so on. And vice-versa,
when it comes to this ‘bottom-level’ the information has to come back up.
Research Advisor, Slovenian Business and Research Association
Why is a feedback loop important for the lobbyists? The members give
them support for lobbying and a negotiation mandate for lobbying at the
eu level and often act as lobbyers at the national level. National members
or, better said, national organization and experts are usually correspon-
dents for the eu level, feeding them with information from the national
and local levels. Members provide resources for the lobbying activities
at the eu level, which is crucial especially for the pressure groups of pri-
vate interests which are usually more dependent on the resources of their
members compared to ngos dealing with social issues, as the latter have
easier access to funding by an eu institution. There is a need for a posi-
tive, well-informed communication loop between the Brussels level and
the national level. In that sense we could argue that civil society orga-
nized at the level of the eu and the national levels represents introverted
circles that have in most cases only weak (face-to-face) links to the other
level. The (horizontal) links between national representations are even
weaker – which is an obstacle to building a stronger common position
and identification with the organization as a whole, as federal strategies
are especially eﬀective when members can participate in more than one
national group, thus weaving personal ties among these groups and re-
inforcing a sense of identity with the larger whole (Putnam 2004, 278) –
but as it seems, building horizontal ties among national or local groups
remains the future task of eu associations. What is the reason for this
state of aﬀairs?
Lobbying in Brussels is a very technocratic job. It is a profession on
its own, grasping specialised knowledge of eu aﬀairs and contacts in a
specific sector of policy-making in the eu. The national members are
not interested in having the skills of an eu lobbyer and to in being able
to actively participate in lobbying, but they do need representation. An-
other reason for ‘communication filters’ between national and eu levels
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was seen in the predominantly virtual form of communication among
diﬀerent levels. Members are geographically distanced from each other
and in many cases they do not know each other, or even the Brussels of-
fice does not know them personally. If there is no personal contact it is
even harder to engage them in the process. If somebody is disinterested
to begin with, if they only hear from ‘Brussels’ in a virtual setting, it is re-
ally hard for them to become actually physically involved in the process.
When there is just interest from one side in this quasi-virtual space, this
creates problems and gaps in communication.
How can the communication between the layers be improved?
• Personalisation of experience: by trying to find ways to increase the
human touch because this is ultimately the best way of communi-
cation. Examples of good practices are small-scale workshops and
‘field trips’, which make the experience of the eu level tangible, ap-
plicable and more personal.
• Leadership of the eu associations is an under-researched area but
what can be detected is a lack of ‘big’ or, better put, European lead-
ers. Leadership as perceived in the modern world is really an Ameri-
can concept. In Europe we have to redefine the concept of leadership
in terms of the capacity to lead in a multi-national, multi-cultural
and multi-lingual environment. Strong leadership figures who are
present over a long period of time could have a stronger capacity to
mobilise people for participation and to facilitate communication
across the filters of diﬀerent layers.
• Legitimacy: in the sense of having trust and confidence in certain
organizations as opposed to others. There is a certain boldness on
the part of European institutions and the civic organizations at the
eu level to fulfil their goals and to present their implementation.
Even the Commission and all the civic associations should have to
legitimise themselves; by fulfilling their obligations to the mem-
bers. This is broader than just communicating the ideas or being
transparent. Incorporating legitimacy into the organization’s strat-
egy could have positive eﬀects for both communication and trans-
parency.
• The issue of transparency – all of the stakeholders are calling for
transparency – at the eu level and at the level of member states. A
more transparent structure of communication could facilitate com-
munication within the organizational structure. In this context, the
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problem of virtual or semi-virtual organizations was presented – in
the majority of cases it is hard to identify their actual membership
and the role of the members in the organization.
These findings can be compelemnted with other current studies (see
Warleigh 2001; 2003; Kohler-Koch and B. Finke 2007; Deth Van et al.
2006; Maloney and Rossteuchtscher 2007) which are suggesting that Eu-
ropean civic associations display little interest in educating their mem-
bers back in the member states about eu issues, but rather get caught
up within the ivory tower world of Brussels institutional politics. We can
encounter a situation of civil society associations becoming elitist in a
way that leadership distances itself from the followers instead of provid-
ing incentives for citizens’ active participation. In an attempt to detach
the elite networks into which leaders of civic organizations are included,
a study was carried out in Slovenia and Poland (in the frame of eu’s
6th framework Connex project). The study was carried out by coworkers
of the Center for Theoretical Sociology at the Faculty of Social Sciences
(see Adam 2007b) in Ljubljana and a research team aﬃliated to the In-
stitute of Philosophy and Sociology at the Polish Academy of Science in
Warsaw (see Gasior-Niemec at al. 2007). In February and March 2007
we conducted a series of structured interviews. One of the preliminary
conclusions of this study concerns the relationships between the leader-
ship of national civic organizations (which are usually also the ones who
represent the civic organizationmembers in European civic associations)
and the members of these organizations. We encounter a situation where
non-governmental organizations, in order to exert democratic eﬀects,
have to perform in accordance with ‘the logic of influence’. If a particular
organization is to be successfully engaged in participation (networking),
i. e. being able to eﬀectively represent issues or assert influence, it may be
necessary to act in pursuit of influence, even if this would consequently
mean putting the role of membership behind (Kristan 2007). The study
confirmed the assumption that the leadership of civic organizations does
not necessarily need to consult membership regarding important issues.
On the contrary, it happens quite often that only a few people decide,
which raises a serious doubts regarding the democratic nature of civic
organizational structures. Their democratic eﬀects are thus highly con-
tingent. We can also encounter a new type of elitism – civic elitism – that
still needs to be researched.
The irony of all this focus upon transnational structures of organized
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civil society is that eu policies do open up spaces for civic engagement
which do have potential to connect societal actors to transnational sys-
tems of governance. Though they may not directly bring about the
democracy enhancing eﬀects, they can, nevertheless, function as agenda-
setters and provide a counter-balance to state and economic actors. By
providing an intermediary infrastructure they support the articulation
and bundling of societal interests and are also able to give their own im-
petus to the definition of these interests. But by placing so much empha-
sis upon the need for a transnationalised and Europeanized civil society,
the eu institutions seems to undermine the very claims for the inclu-
sion of civil society which prompted the search for a means of bridging
the gap between society and transnational governance. As Armstrong
points out (2001), though the explicit objective is to further transna-
tional cooperation, eu policies focusing predominantly on the eu-level
organized civil society may in practice create additional obstacles, and
domestic civil society actors may further lose influence as transnational
governance and transnational civil society take on greater roles – with a
stress on representing interests and lobbying – while having only weak
links among diﬀerent levels of eu governance, which is not really a fertile
ground for the establishment of mechanisms of vertical accountability
that may include citizens acting through civic organizations on the eu
level.
Conclusion
The notion of ‘democratic deficit’ of the eu is – as much as it is based
on understandable frustration of many Europeans with ‘detached’ and
often unresponsive political institutions – problematic since it derives
from the assumption of ‘transplantability’ of the democratic principles
from the level of member-states to the eu institutions. There are certain
limits of democracy at the eu level if one means by the term ‘democ-
racy’ the majoritarian principle with equal weight of each citizen’s po-
litical preference (the rule ‘one person, one vote’). The reason for this
‘democratic deficiency’ is the non-existence of a European constitutional
demos (Weiler, Haltern, and Mayer 1995; Weiler 2002), i. e. a European-
wide constituency sharing common values and identity that would re-
place – or at least complement – national ones. The European demos,
European public and European civil society could be established only in
an evaluative way.
One can argue that participatory democracy is unrealistic at the eu
Volume 6 · Number 4 · Winter 2008
416 Matevž Tomšicˇ and Mateja Rek
level, which holds also for citizens’ engagement in European civil society.
According to the above mentioned, it can be argued that the establish-
ment of mechanisms of vertical (electoral) accountability correspond-
ing to those in nation-states is, at the moment, not an option at the eu
level. What is more feasible is the creation of institutions of horizon-
tal accountability, i. e. highly professional, competent and autonomous
bodies that would supervise activities of the key executive institutions
of the eu. This means in the first place strengthening of the European
rule of law and policies that would enhance the transparency of Euro-
pean policies.⁴¹ Civil associations, organized at the eu level, could be a
factor of accountability of European political institutions but in a rather
elite manner, meaning not through direct involvement of citizenry and
representation of grass-root initiatives but through advocacy of diﬀerent
important interests of social, economic, political or cultural nature and
informing political institutions as well as the general public on the is-
sues that are of their particular concern. They can be perceived as a part
of the European system of checks and balances, where diﬀerent actors
from both the political sphere and civil society cooperate in the process
of policy-making to exchange information on diﬀerent issues as well as
to monitor each other’s activities.
Notes
1 14 individuals (4 scientists, 2 representatives of business eu associations,
1 representative of a think-tank dealing with eu policies, 2 representatives
of civic eu associations, 4 representatives of liaison oﬃces in the field of
research and a representative of the European Commission) participated
in our focus group. For further information on the participants and out-
comes of the focus group, visit: http://www.connex-network.org/.
2 Some analysts argue that the institutional setting of the eu already con-
tains mechanisms to provide accountability of European policy-makers.
As stated by Moravcsik (2002, 604): ‘Constitutional checks and balances,
indirect democratic control via national governments, and the increasing
powers of the European Parliament are suﬃcient to ensure the eu policy-
making is, in nearly all cases, clean, transparent, eﬀective and politically
responsive to the demands of European citizens.’
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